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VOLUME XXIV

AUTUMN, 1955

NUMBER 3

EXTRADITION FROM CANADA TO THE UNITED
STATES FOR SECURITIES FRAUD: FRUSTRATION
OF THE NATIONAL POLICIES OF
BOTH COUNTRIEST
WILLIAM H. TIMBERS* AND IRVING M. POLLACK**

INTRODUCTION

T HE four thousand mile border between the United States and Canada
has long symbolized the ultimate in cordial relations between two
sovereign nations. It has been an instrument to facilitate, rather than

a barrier against, the free flow of trade and the movement of citizens
between the two countries. In the important area of extradition from

Canada to the United States of persons indicted for violating the United
States securities laws, however, the border unfortunately has been
utilized to frustrate the national policies of the United States and

Canada.
For more than two decades the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission' has been confronted with the problem of the fraudulent
operations of a small but highly successful group of broker-dealers
peddling worthless securities into the United States from across the
Canadian border by long distance telephone and the mails? It has been
t The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disdaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of
the authors' colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
* Member of the New York, Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; General
Counsel of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Formerly with Davis,
Polk, Waldwell, Sunderland and Kiendl, New York City, and Cummings and Lockwood,
Stamford, Connecticut.
** Member of the New York Bar; Attorney, General Counsel's Office of the United
States Securities and Exchange Comson.
1. The "S.E.C." was established pursuant to § 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 885, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(d), which became effective July 1, 1934, 48 Stat. 90S,
15 US.C.A. § 78(hh). See 1st Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 1, 8 (1935), for details concerning
the organization and assumption of functions by the Commission under that Act and the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(a).
2. See testimony of then S.E.C. Commissioner Richard B. McEntire on March 3, 1952
before the U.. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Report of that Committee
on Executive G (Supplementary Extradition Convention with Canada), S. Exec. Rep. No.
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estimated in past years that the predatory activities of these securities
confidence men have resulted in the extraction from American investors
of sums ranging from ten to fifty million dollars annually.8
In July of 1952, after many years of intermittent negotiations, a Supplementary Extradition Convention with Canada was finally ratified,4
which was specifically designed to provide extradition for securities
frauds. 5 It was hoped and anticipated that with the mutual cooperation
of enforcement authorities of both countries this convention would go a
long way toward eliminating the depredations of these securities salesmen, by permitting their extradition for trial to the United States where
the victims resided and the basic evidence necessary for their prosecution was available.' However, less than two and a half years later, these
high hopes were dealt a substantial blow when, in the first case7 brought
under the new extradition arrangements,8 extradition was denied by the
Associate Chief Justice of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec, sitting as extradition judge. 9 Although having previously ruled that
5, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 3, 5-16 (1952); 17th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 159 (1951), and 18th
Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 179 (1952).
3. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 3, 6.
4. The treaty came into force on July 11, 1952. See T.I.A.S. No. 2454 (1952), U.S.
Dep't of State Pub. No. 4709 (1952); Can. T. S., 1952, No. 12 (1953).
S. "The United States of America and Canada, being desirous of modifying and sup.
plementing in certain respects the lists of crimes on account of which extradition may be
granted . . . so as to comprehend any and all frauds which are punishable criminally by
the laws of both contracting states, particularly those which occur in connection with
transactions in securities, have decided to conclude a Supplementary Convention for that
purpose. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Preamble to Supplementary Extradition Convention
between Canada and U.S.A. (1952), supra note 4. See also S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra
note 2; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 10 and Report to House of the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the Canadian House of Commons, 6th Sess., 21st
Parl., 1952.
6. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 4, 9, 13; 98 Cong. Rec. 3241 (1952); 17th
Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 159 (1951), 18th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 179 (1952).
7. In the Matter of U.S.A. and Walter H. Link and Harry H. Green, No. 134, Superior
Court, Province of Quebec, District of Montreal, judgment rendered Dec. 17, 1954, officially
reported as U.S.A. v. Link and Green (1955) 3 D.L.R. 386, leave to appeal denied [1955)
S.C.R. 183.
8. The extradition request was based on two of four indictments returned In the U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the ED. of Mich., Southern Division, on April 27, 1954, United States v. T. M.
Parker Inc.; one indictment (No. 34275) charges violations of the mail fraud statute,
62 Stat. 763, 63 Stat. 94, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1949), the other indictment, also based
on use of the mails (No. 34276), charges violations of the anti-fraud provisions (section
17(a)) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a) (1933). See 20th
Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 103-04 (1954) and S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 842, dated April
27, 1954, for additional details as to the charges in this case.
9. Honorable W. B. Scott of the District of Montreal, acting pursuant to § 9(1) of the
Canadian Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 322.
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he was fully satisfied that a prima facie case had been established as to
the fraud offenses charged against the two accused, 0 the extradition
judge nevertheless denied extradition because he did not approve of the
evidence which would be admissible in the United States prosecution to
establish the offenses charged in the indictments upon which the extradition was requested." In view of the tremendous adverse precedential
impact such a judgment could have upon future extradition cases, application was made to the Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal
the adverse decision." The application was heard on March 7, 1955,
by the complete nine judge panel of the Court 13 and was unanimously
denied for lack of jurisdiction.' 4
After summarizing the background of the securities fraud extradition
problem, we shall analyze the extradition judge's decision with a view to
demonstrating the errors inherent in it and to advancing certain procedural reforms which we believe essential, if proper effectuation is
to be accorded extradition arrangements entered into in good faith between the high contracting parties.
10. Both Canada and the United States require that before an accused may be committed for extradition the requesting country must produce such evidence as would justify
his committal for trial, if the crime had been committed in the country of asylum. Section
18(1) (b) Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9; 62 Stat. 822, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (1943);
art. X, Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, 8 Stat. 572. See also Re United States and
Grossberg, 41 C.C.C. 306, 315 (1921) and Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1922).
For a discussion as to the necessity and advisability of requiring such a showing, see 18
Cornell L.Q. 608 (1933) (against) and 31 Mich. L. Rev. 544 (1933) (in favor).
11. The judge phrased it in these terms:
"Although lIB [of the treaty] deals with making use of the mails in connection with
schemes devised or intended to deceive or defraud the public or for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretences, it would be manifestly unjust, unfair and grievously
prejudicial to the accused to surrender them for trial on indictments where, in addition to
the charges of fraudulent use of the mails, fraudulent telephone calls constituting false
pretences and fraud committed in Canada without using the mails would also be put to
the jury.
"To hold otherwise would be contrary to law and to our established principles of British
justice."
12. The application was made under § 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act of Canada,
1952 R.S.C., c. 259. See, Application for Special Leave to Appeal, U.A., Appellant, and
Walter H. Link and Harry H. Green, Respondents, Supreme Court of Canada, dated
February 1, 1955, p. 203.

13. Customarily, applications of this type are heard only by from one to five judges.
14. US.A. v. Link and Green [1955] S.C.R. 183. The decision was announced by
the Chief Justice in open court at the conclusion of the argument. The argument was
confined solely to the jurisdictional issue, the Chief Justice having noted previously that
the importance of the problem was self-evident.
Another avenue is still open by which a determination could be obtained from the
Canadian Supreme Court on the important questions raised by the adverse extradition
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BACKGROUND OF THE SECURITIES FRAUD EXTRADITION PROBLii
Transfer of "Boiler-Room" OperationsFrom the United States to Canada
The enactment of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 193415 and
the vigorous enforcement which followed rendered it virtually impossible

for the securities "boiler-room"' 16 operators to continue their activities

in the United States with any degree of safety. Accordingly, a group
of these securities salesmen, who never have lacked for ingenuity, conceived the idea of transferring the scene of their operations across the
border to Canada.YI The modem city of Toronto in the Province of
Ontario with its central location and close proximity to the United
States was chosen by them as the center of operations. Their typical fraud
promotions were dependent not upon personal contact but almost entirely upon mass mail campaigns and vigorous and extensive telephone
solicitation.'" This type of fraudulent selling could as easily be continued from that convenient location as from cities within the United
States. The Canadian border provided on the one hand an excellent
screen for the share-pushing activities of these promoters and on the
other hand has been used as a curtain of protection against apprehension.' The only method by which the United States enforcement
authorities could hope to crush and effectively exterminate such operations was by way of extradition. 0 Unfortunately, the offenses included
in the then existing extradition arrangements were inadequate to meet
the modem fraud techniques employed by telephone and mail securities
promoters.
judgment. Under § 55 of the Supreme Court Act of Canada, supra note 12, the Governor
in Council (i.e. the Canadian Cabinet) may, if it sees fit, submit such questions to the
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion, special jurisdiction being conferred upon the
court to hear and consider all such submitted matters.
15. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934; see supra note 1.
16. This is the colloquial term used in the securities field to describe the premises
from which the high pressure telephone solicitation is conducted. Normally, in a "boilerroom" operation each telephone salesman will be equipped with two telephones, so that a
constant continuity of calls may be maintained without any loss of time. It is a frequent
practice to use so-called sequence calls, i.e., a number of calls are placed simultancously
with the long distance telephone operator with instructions to place the calls in the order
given, so that no time will be wasted in picking up the next call.
17. Thus, while originally these long distance securities operators were mostly Immigrants from the United States, it was not long before a number of Canadians were
trained by them and succeeded in large measure to the control of the fraudulent enterprises. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 11.
18. See 27 Dep't of State Bull. 67 (1952); Loss, Securities Regulation 1173 (Ist cd,
1951).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. Ibid.

SECURITIES FRAUD
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842
The first extradition arrangements with Canada were provided by the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 184221 between the United States and the
British Empire.? Although primarily concerned with the settlement of
boundaries, provision was made in the treaty for extradition for the
crime of murder and six other specified offenses. The entire extradition
agreement was included in just one short paragraph comprising article
X of the treaty23 Thus the pattern was established between the two
governments for "list-type" extradition arrangements, wherein it is
agreed to extradite for the specified but undefined offenses named there24
in.
Blaine-Pauncefote Convention Gf 1889
In 1889, the Blaine-Pauncefote Convention " provided for the embodi-

ment of a number of additional basic extradition provisions and the inclusion of ten items of additional offenses for which extradition was
to be granted. Included among these are two of some interest here, since
they represent the first attempts to provide extradition for any fraud type
offenses. One of the added items covered the crime of .... receiving
any money, valuable security, or other property, knowing the same to
have been embezzled, stolen or fraudulently obtained"; the other item
covered "Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, or director,
21. 8 Stat. 572. For delegation of powers to the Parliament and Government of
Canada, respecting obligations of Canada under treaties between the British Empire and
foreign countries, see section 132, art. IX The British North America Act, 1867, 30 Victor"a
c. 3, R.S.C. 1952, at 6212.
22. Both the United States and Canada adhere to the principle that international extradition shall be granted only in accordance with applicable statutes or treaties. See Valentine v. United States ex re. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) ; Draft Convention on Extradition,
29 Am. J. Int'l L. 74 (1935 Supp.). See also Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9,and
U.S. Extradition Provisions, 62 Stat. 822, 18 U..C.A. § 3181 (194S), §§ 3184-3195, which
provide substantially similar procedures for implementing international extradition arrangements.
23. It is of interest to note that even at this early date the extradition provision as
written to cover not only persons who sought asylum in the foreign country but also
persons "found" therein.
24. So long as the list is confined to well known offenses similarly described in both
countries, this presents no great problem. However, in the case of other less well established offenses and particularly in the case of statutorily created offenses, this procedure
obviously gives rise to questions of interpretation as to the 'coverage of the treaty. For
this reason it was early suggested that it might be preferable to list in extradition treaties
the actual statutes or crimes of each country which are intended to be covered. See Draft
Convention on Extradition, supra note 22, app. L at 74-75, 82. This in turn, however,
may lead to other difficulties, in view of the frequent statutory revisions which occur with
the passage of time.
25. 26 Stat. 1508.
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or member or officer of any company, made criminal by the laws of both
countries."2 6 The limited application of these provisions is apparent.27
They are important, however, in demonstrating the concern at this early
date, at least with respect to the fraud offenses falling within the scope
of these items.
Supplementary Conventions of 1900, 1905, 1922 and 1925
In 1900 the list of offenses was further supplemented, and among
the offenses then added was the crime of "obtaining money, valuable
securities or other property by false pretenses. ' 28 Additional offenses
were added by Supplementary Conventions in 1905, 1922 and 1925,20
but the fraud coverage of the extradition arrangements was not affected
by these amendments.30
The offense of obtaining money by means of false pretenses, limited
as it is to the restrictive common law concept covering only misrepresentations regarding past or present facts,3 1 was obviously insufficient to cope with the twentieth century techniques developed by
accomplished telephone and mail order security fraud promoters. Their
fraudulent selling schemes, relying almost exclusively upon promissory
type representations and glowing and fictitious representations as to the
future, in order to whet the appetite of and deceive unsophisticated persons, were beyond the reach of this limited offense. 32
Early S.E.C. Efforts to Obtain Extradition Treaty Revision
Accordingly, very soon after creation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, consideration was given to the feasibility of obtaining
26. Items 3 and 4, art. I of the Convention.
27. See Rex v. Nesbitt, [1913] 28 O.L.R. 91, 21 C.C.C. 251, 11 D.L.R. 708, 20 Can. Abr.
31. Cf. Browne v. United States, [1906] 30 Que. S.C. 363, 11 C.C.C. 167, 20 Can. Abr. 123.
28. Item 11 of the Supplementary Convention of 1900, 32 Stat. 1864. By the mechanical
application of the narrow principle of ejusdem generis, this provision has been held by the
Canadian courts to be inapplicable to the offense of obtaining goods by false pretenses.
In re Rosen, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 799, 44 B.C.R. 203, 20 Can. Abr. 31.
29. 34 Stat. 2093, 42 Stat. 2224, 44 Stat. 2100.
30. The 1922 convention, which added the offenses of wilful desertion and non-support
of dependent children, was restricted in its application to extradition between the United
States and Canada, an apparent recognition of the need for special treatment In view of
the common and open border between the two countries. See article II of this convention.
Similarly, the 1925 convention, which covered narcotic offenses, was entered into only
with respect to Canada. See Preamble and article II of this convention.
31. See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697 (C.A. D.C. 1946); § 404 (now § 303W,
see infra note 71) of the Canadian Criminal Code.
32. Similarly, the treaty provision added in 1889 covering frauds by the fiduciary
persons designated therein, see text supra, is easily avoided by their practice of acting In a
principal capacity as dealers and by their scrupulously avoiding appearance as record
officers of the companies whose securities they are distributing.
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an amendment of the extradition arrangements with Canada, so as to
meet this new international securities fraud problem. A completely
new extradition treaty with Canada was even then under discussion by the State Department. One of the offenses suggested for inclusion in the proposed revised treaty arrangements was use of the mails
to defraud. Informal exploratory discussions were had, at least on this
side of the border, relative to the addition of security act type offenses
as well, but the whole treaty revision program came to naught, apparently lost among the more pressing economic problems of the day.
The Lamar Case
In 1940 an unsuccessful effort was made to obtain the extradition of
one Lamar, a partner in a Texas securities brokerage firm, who fled
to Canada after being indicted" for violating the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act,34 the Mail Fraud and Conspiracy Statutes.' Although the total loss to investors was in the neighborhood of $100,000,
in an effort to bring the case within the existing treaty arrangements,
extradition was sought only for a single Securities Act count based on
the charge that the accused had misrepresented in a confirmation sent
to a customer his cost of purchasing a security, thereby causing the
customer to overpay $175.36 Extradition was denied37 on the grounds
(1) that a prima facie violation of the Securities Act was not made out
because the money was obtained before the mailing of the confirmation,
(2) that no prima fade case of false pretenses under Canadian law was
shown because the money passed before the untrue statement was made,
and (3) that, because the charge under section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act was based on the obtaining of the money by means of an untrue
statement of a material fact "by the use of the mails," this was "a
specific kind of offense under a particular law" not included within the
extradition arrangements.
Negotiations for Extradition Treaty Revision, 1941-1945
The lack of success in the Lamar case and continuing activities of
the coterie of Toronto operators gave new impetus to the efforts to obtain a more effective treaty arrangement with Canada. Once more the
33.
prison
(W.D.
34.
35.

A co-defendant was convicted on his plea of guilty and sentenced to a three-year
term. See 7th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C., Table 11, 328 (1941), United States v. Bedford
Tex.), (unreported).
Section 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.CA. § 77q(a) (1933).
Now §§ 1341 and 371, respectively, tit. 18 U.S.CA., 63 Stat. 94, 62 Stat. 701 (1949)

(1948).
36. See discussion of this case in S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 10-11.
37. Re Larnar, [19403 2 W.W.R. 471, 73 C.C.C. 194, 2 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 19. See
Comment on case in Loss, op. cit. supra note 18, at 1172-73.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

approach took the form of a wholly new extradition agreement. Negotiations were reopened with the Canadian authorities in the early summer
of 1941. By the end of April, 1942, the new proposed treaty was signed
by representatives of both. countries.3 8 A comprehensive list of offenses
was incorporated in the new proposal, which included all of the offenses
previously covered and many new ones. 9 From the Commission's viewpoint the important additions were those covering (1) use of the mails
to defraud, 0 (2) crimes against the laws for the prevention of fraud in
the sale or purchase of securities, 41 (3) crimes against the laws regulating "(a) public securities markets, or activities affecting such markets;
(b) registration or licensing of securities or persons or companies doing
business in securities, or giving advice with respect thereto; (c) investment or public utility companies.1 42 The Commission considered the
coverage of the treaty to be ideal. It would generally have made extraditable all types of federal securities offenses 43 and would have comprehended not only fraud violations, but also criminal violations of the

registration and other regulatory provisions of the various acts administered by the Commission."
Another innovation was the inclusion in the treaty of a specific provision45 eliminating the double criminality doctrine in extradition proceedings, i.e. the necessity of establishing that the offense for which
extradition is sought is a crime in the requested as well as in the requesting country. The proviso was inserted to insure that the broad coverage
of the treaty would not be defeated by application of that doctrine and
findings that its double criminality requirements were not met. 40
The treaty was quickly approved by the United States Senate. 47 It
38. The treaty is set forth in S. Exec. C, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
39. Art. III of the Treaty, S. Exec. C, supra note 38, at 3-4.
40. Id. Item 26.
41. Id. Item 32.
42. Id. Item 32. And by Item 33 the extradition coverage was further extended to
include "... . participation or conspiracy in any of the crimes ... or any attempt to commit
any of such crimes."
43. The provisions were broad enough to cover offenses under the various state securities laws, as well.
44. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(a) ; Securities Exchange Act

of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.CA. § 78(a); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77(aaa); Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, 15 U.S.CA. § 80b-1.
45. Article IX of the Treaty.
46. Discussed in greater detail, p. 319 infra.
47. Transmitted May 6, 1942, made public May 11, 1942, approved May 27, 1942.
See S. Exec. C, supra note 38, and 88 Cong. Rec. 4641 (1942). It was ratified by the
President on June 6, 1942. See S. Exec. I, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1945).
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provoked a great deal of controversy in Canada, however, and was never
acted upon by the Canadian Parliament. All sorts of hypothetical applications were suggested to make it appear that under the treaty innocent
persons would be subject to extradition for unwitting violations of the
various state and federal securities laws. 48 Three of the leading objections to the treaty which were advanced were (1) that it was retroactive,
(2) that it would permit extradition for fraud under the laws of the
United States, even though such acts were not illegal in Canada, and
(3) that Canadian publishers might be extradited if a copy of their
publications, which carried advertisements for the sale of securities,
reached the United States. 49
Further negotiations were undertaken to resolve these differences.
Finally, in November, 1945, in an effort to meet these objections, a Protocol amending the 1942 proposal was agreed upon. 0
The Protocol provided that the treaty would not be retroactive and
that insofar as the offense of mail fraud and the various securities offenses were concerned 51 extradition would not be available as to persons
dealing in securities in compliance with the laws of the requested country, unless the offense involved "... (a) fraud, as defined by the laws
of both countries, or (b) wilful and knowing violation of the laws of the
requesting country."5 2 It also provided that the extradition provisions
would not apply to any publisher of a periodical primarily intended for
sale and circulation in the requested country and the circulation of
which was only incidental in the requesting country. 3 Despite these
concessions and amendments, the treaty was never approved by the
Canadian Parliament."
Stop-Gap S.E.C. Enforcement Efforts
Meanwhile, the failure to achieve a revised extradition arrangement
and the increased interest in securities resulting from the post-war boom,
gave additional impetus to the activities of these fraudulent securities
operators. The result was an immense increase in the number of illicit
promotions emanating from Toronto "boiler-rooms" and, as time passed,
the problem became more and more acute.
While attempts were being made to negotiate new extradition ar48. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 11.
49. See S. Exec. I, supra note 47, at 2-3.

50. Ibid.
51.
52.
53.
54.
bates

Items 26, 31, 32 of Act IM of the 1942 Treaty.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the 1945 Protocol
Id., paragraph 2.
For a summary of the objections advanced with respect to this proposal, see Deof Canadian House of Commons 2427-28 (1952).

310
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rangements, the Commission, in an effort to meet the problem at least
partially, investigated many of these promotions, with the result that
a number of indictments were obtained in the United States." For the
most part the indictments were not made public, but were kept secret,
with the thought that some of the promoters might be unwary enough
to cross the border into the United States. On two occasions the defendants did so and they were promptly apprehended; in both instances,
however, the defendants, to avoid standing trial, forfeited bail of $50,000
and $25,000 respectively, and fled back to Canada.50
In addition, in a further effort to cripple these illicit operations, the
Commission, in cooperation with the United States Post Office Department, obtained the issuance by that department of "fraud and fictitious
name orders"' 5 7 against a large number of such operators. 8 In effect,
these orders banned the delivery of mail from the United States to the
violators against whom they were issued. These measures, however, were
only partially successful in view of the inherent difficulty of screening
out the banned mail and the fact that continual amendments of the
orders were necessary, because the promoters with their typical ingenuity
changed their addresses or used different return mail addresses or other
similar dodges in order to defeat or make more difficult the enforcement
of the mail ban.59
Concomitantly with the above measures the newspaper, magazine and
radio media were most effective in publicizing the fraudulent activities
of the fringe group of operators and warning United States investors
against their deceitful solicitations. 0
In the meantime, the operations of this small minority of high pressure
55. The first convictions in these types of cases were obtained in United States v. E. M.
McLean (E.D. Mich.), aff'd sub nom. Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948). See 11th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 82-83 (1945), 15th
Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 170 (1949).
56. United States v. Albert Edward De Palma (N.D. Ohio), (unreported) and United
States v. Noel H. Knowles (ED. N.Y.), (unreported). See 14th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 103
(1948) and 15th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 170 (1949); S.Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 11;
Loss, op. cit. supra note 18, at 1173.
57. 17 Stat. 322, 26 Stat. 466, 28 Stat. 964; 25 Stat. 873, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 259, 255 (1875)
(1889). See Loss, op. cit. supra note 18, at 806 n. 1.
58. See 15th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 170-71 (1949); 16th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 152-53
(1950) ; 17th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 159-60 (1951) ; S.Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 12.
59. See 17th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 159 (1951); S.Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 12.
60. Ibid. Publicity of this type was not restricted to the United States; Canadian newspapers and periodicals also were calling attention to the harmful activities of this group
of Toronto stock promotion houses. See, e.g., "All that Glitters is not Gold," Financial
Post (Toronto), April 15, 1950, p. 1; "High-Pressure Stock Promotions are Going Full
Blast," Toronto Daily Star, Nov. 25, 1949, p. 15.
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share-pushers not only were causing extensive damage in the United
States; they also unfortunately were having a serious adverse effect upon
all Canadian legitimate enterprises by creating an overall aura of distrust in the minds of American investors against all Canadian securities
and investments.6" In the summer of 1951 a crime committee of the
Ontario Provincial legislature conducted an investigation into the activities of such promoters. This also served to throw a floodlight of un2
favorable publicity upon their fraudulent promotions.0
Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1952
In early 1951, active discussions once again were renewed with the
Canadian Dominion authorities concerning revision of the extradition
arrangements between the two countries.0 3 Since the main objective was to halt the more serious violations, i.e. fraudulent promotions rather than violations of the securities registrations provisions, the former broad treaty proposal was abandoned. Instead
the negotiators now concentrated on working out more limited extradition provisions which would effectively meet the fraud problem.
The negotiations were successful. On October 26, 1951, a Supplementary Extradition Convention was signed. This ultimately became effective on July 11, 1952, after ratification by both governments. 4
To achieve the desired objective of providing extradition for securities
frauds, the Convention added, in substitution for the old restricted and
limited false pretenses extradition provision which had been added in
1900,65 the following two new provisions: 6°
"11A 'Obtaining property, money or valuable securities by false pretences or by
defrauding the public or any person by deceit or falsehood or other fraudulent
means, whether such deceit or falsehood or any fraudulent means would or would
not amount to a false pretence.

"11B WMaking use of the mails in connection with schemes devised or intended to
deceive or defraud the public or for the purpose of obtaining money under false
pretences.'"

In the Preamble to the Supplementary Convention the parties made
it plain that by the addition of these two items it was their intention
to modify and supplement the list of extradition crimes "so as to comprehend any and all frauds which are punishable criminally by the laws
of both contracting states, particularly those which occur in connection
61.
62.
63.

See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 15.
See, e.g., Newsweek, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 42.
See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 14; 16th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 153 (1950).

64. See note 4 supra.
65. Item 11 of the Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1900, supra note 28.
66. Art. I of the 1952 Convention, supra note 4.
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with transactions in securities.1 67 The reports of the respective Canadian
and United States legislative committees6 8 also make plain that the new
treaty provisions were intended to comprehend violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 193309 and the United States
Mail Fraud Statute,70 and the analogous fraud provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code 7 ' and the Capadian Mail Fraud Statute,7 2 the
67. See notes 4, 5 supra.
68. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 10 and Report of the Standing
Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons, 6th Sess., 21st Parl. (1952) on
the Supplementary Extradition Convention between the United States and Canada at
267-69, 281, 287; S. Exec. Doc. G, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952); S. Exec. Rep. No. 5,
supra note 2, at 1, 4, 14.
69. Section 17(a) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2)
to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading, or
(3)

to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." (Emphasis added.)
On October 10, 1954 the italicized words "offer or" appearing before the word "sale"
were added to the section by Pub. L. No. 577, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 10, 1954). This
amendment was required because of other revisions of the statute which were effected at
that time. It involved no change in the section's coverage, since "sale" was defined
previously by § 2(3) of the Act, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(3) (1933) as including
"offers."
70. 63 Stat. 94, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1949) which provides:
"Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply
or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security,
or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfelt or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting
so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mall according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
71. 1948 c. 39, section 444 which provides:
"Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to five years' imprisonment who,
by deceit or falsehood or other fraudulent means, defrauds the public or any person, ascertained or unascertained, or affects the public market price of stocks, shares, merchandise,
or anything else publicly sold, whether such deceit or falsehood or other fraudulent means
would or would not amount to a false pretense as hereinbefore defined."
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latter section having been broadened by amendment in June 1 9 5 1 " to
make it more nearly parallel to the comparable United States fraud
statutes and "so that the double criminality standard would be clearly
mel '7
In the interim, the prospective adoption of an extradition treaty,
coupled with a vigorous enforcement program by the local Ontario securities authorities, had virtually halted the activities of the Toronto "boilerroom" operators by the time the treaty was finally ratified in July of
1952.75 But unfortunately it did not remain so for very long.
Not many months after the new treaty provisions became effective a
number of Toronto operators surreptitiously transferred their activities
to the city of Montreal where, operating behind fronts, they once again
commenced their high pressure mail and telephone securities fraud
promotions into the United States. One of the most flagrant of these,
the T. M. Parker, Inc. promotion 7 6 provided the first extradition
7 under the 1952 Supplementary
casew
Extradition Convention.
THE T. M. PAR=ER, INC. PROMOTION
Nature of Scheme Involved
As previously noted, the extradition proceedings were based upon
Mail Fraud and Securities Act indictments returned in the United States
in April, 1954.78 The extradition charges involved a 'boiler-room" promotion which was conducted from Montreal in the late spring and early
summer of 1953.
The evidence adduced at the extradition hearing showed that the promotion followed the acquisition and reactivation of T. M. Parker, Inc.,
a dormant securities firm of Montreal. In the short period of approxiA recodification and renumbering of the Canadian Criminal Code became effective April
1, 1955; this section is now 1953-54 c. 51 § 323(1) and (2).
72. 1951 c. 47, § 12 (renumbered 1953-54 c. 51), §*209(c) now § 324, which provides:
'TEveryone is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to two years' imprion-nt
who makes use of the mails for the purpose of transmitting or delivering ... (c)any
letter or circular concerning schemes devised or intended to deceive and defraud the
public, or for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretenses."
73. The amendment substituted the phrase "makes use of the mails for the purpore of
transmitting or delivering" for the prior language "posts for transmission or delivery by
or through the post." Dominion of Canada Laws, 1951, c. 47, § 12..
74. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 14. See also Report of the Standing
Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons, supra note 5, at 267-69, 287.
75. 18th Ann. Rep. of S.E.C. 179 (1952); S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, supra note 2, at 13;
Debates of Canadian Senate, 6th Sess., 21st ParL, 319 (1952).
76. This was the corporate name under which the sales campaign was conducted.
77. U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.. at 398).
78. Indictments Nos. 34275, 76, S.D. E.D. 2ich.
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mately ten weeks during which the promotion was actively in operation
over $300,000 was obtained from United States investors residing in
some forty states and the District of Columbia. 0
It was further shown that at the height of the promotion some twenty
telephones were in operation in two "boiler-rooms"18 0 and that during
the limited period in which the promotion was conducted the telephone
toll charges amounted to approximately $14,000.81
In essence, the promotion involved the "reloading" 82 of United States
investors, by means of fraudulent letters and high pressure telephone
calls, with additional shares of stock of various Toronto corporations in
which they had previously been induced to invest by Toronto fringe
securities operators. The proof showed that the prices investors paid to
T. M. Parker, Inc. were ten to fifteen times more than the negligible
prices at which the stocks could have been purchased. In numerous instances no delivery was ever made of the stock sold. Every effort was
made to conceal the identities of the participants in the promotion. Only
with considerable difficulty and after intensive investigation were their
true identities uncovered. 3 The overall nature of "this nefarious operation""4 is further illustrated by the more than 200 false and fraudulent
representations which it was alleged were made in soliciting investors
to purchase the various stocks which were the subject of the
promotion. These related to such items as the purported special "rights"
which investors had as shareholders to purchase additional shares at
prices below the current market price, the alleged market and market
price which existed for such shares, the alleged impressive discoveries
and developments which had taken place in properties owned by the
corporation, the guaranteed profits which investors were supposed to
make and a host of other similar matters.8 ,
The Extradition Hearings
The extradition hearings commenced at Montreal in the Superior
Cburt for the Province of Quebec on November 3, and concluded on
79. U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 398).
80. Id. The extradition judge noted (3 D.L.R. at 398): "A glance at the photographs
of the wooden cubicles installed by the carpenter Tash in these small rooms readily shows
how a set-up of this nature has come to be known on the street as a 'boiler-room.'"
81. Id. (3 D.L.R. at 398).
82. This is the colloquial expression used to describe swindles in which Investors are resolicited to make additional investments in the same promotion.
83. See U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 397-98).
84. This is one of a number of similar descriptions used by the extradition judge In
describing the scheme employed in this case. Id. (3 D.L.R. at 397-98).
85. See Application for Special Leave to Appeal, supra note 12, at 26-63, 142-45, 147-53,
157-60, 166-69. See also U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 387-88).
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December 7, 194."s In the course of this five-week hearing, twenty
depositions of United States investors were introduced, and approximately forty witnesses were called on behalf of the United States. The
extradition judge thereupon announced in open court that he was fully
satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out by the prosecution
against the two accused 7 and directed that no further evidence of the
fraud need be adduced.8s However, on December 17, 1954, he handed
down a judgment denying the extradition request.8,
The Extradition Judgment
The extradition judgment referred to a number of arguments which
were advanced as possible grounds for denying the extradition, but the
judge ruled it was unnecessary to reach or decide themY0 Rather he
based his refusal to grant the extradition request wholly upon the ground
that-although he found both the Mail Fraud and Securities Act indictments involved in the extradition request to be within enumeration IIB
of the treaty-in his view it "would be manifestly unjust, unfair and
grievously prejudicial to the accused" and "contrary to law" and to "established principles of British justice" to surrender the accused for trial
in the United States, for under the indictments "in addition to the
charges of fraudulent use of the mails, fraudulent telephone calls constituting false pretenses and fraud committed in Canada without using
the mails would also be put to the jury."9
Impact of the Judgment
The judgment represents a substantial setback to the efforts of both
countries to enforce their respective securities laws. Inherent in the
86. After considerable preliminary groundword, the formal request for extradition was
made in the latter part of October, 1954. Warrants were issued and the two accused were
immediately apprehended, bail was denied and they were remanded to jail. See US.A.v.
Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 387); Application for Special Leave to Appeal,
supra note 12, at 2.

87. One of the defendants also testified in his own behalf. See USA. v. Link and Green,
supra note 7 (3 DXL. at 397).
88. USA. v. Link and Green, supra note 7, vol 22, Record of Evidence and Proceedings (Nov. 30, 1954) pp. 107-09; Application for Special Leave to Appeal, supra
note 12, at 7.
89. As previously pointed out, leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of
Canada was denied by that court on the ground that under the Supreme Court Act of
Canada, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, it lacked jurisdiction to review extradition judgments. See
p. 303 supra.

90. Although the judge expressly declined to rule upon these other contentlons, they
are set forth in some detail in his judgment. We comment on some of these points infra.
See U.SA v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 394-96).
91. See note 11 supra.
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judgment also are additional far-reaching implications. If applied to

other extradition matters, it could well serve to defeat all such requests.
For, wherever the foreign government's trial procedures do not meet
with the approval of the individual extradition judge, he would be free

to deny extradition. This, too, is wholly aside from the fact that in
reaching such a result, the extradition judge might labor under a misunderstanding as to the nature of the offenses involved and the evidence
essential to their proof.
Once the judge found, as he did, that a prima facie case had been
shown before him as to the offenses involved, that the offenses were
within the treaty, that they were crimes under Canadian law, and thus
met the double criminality requirement, he fulfilled his extradition
function.92 In undertaking a consideration of the appropriateness vel
non of the evidentiary rules or procedures which he deemed would be
applicable in the prosecution of the indictments in the United States, it
is believed that he encroached upon the province of the executive.
The trial procedures which may or may not be followed in the requesting country are not a concern of the extradition judge.9 3 They must
be assumed to have been approved by the respective governmental
authorities when the treaties were entered into. 4 Otherwise it would be
impossible, for example, ever to fulfill extradition treaty obligations with
continental countries where the civil law procedures do not include
many of the basic principles (such as trial by jury, presumption of innocence, etc.) deemed essential to Canadian or British, as well as
American, justice. 5
In any event, such considerations are peculiarly within the domain
of the executive departments. The extradition judge's committal of the
92. See §§ 15, 18 and 19, Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9.
93. In re Arton (No. 1), [1896] 1 Q.B. 108, 116: ". . . we must assume that the French
Courts will administer justice in accordance with their own law; and so long as they do

that, or whether they do it or not, we cannot interfere beforehand to prevent them from
exercising in -this particular case the procedure which they exercise with regard to any
criminals who may be brought within their jurisdiction." To the same effect, see Neely v.
Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901). This principle, of course, is equally applicable
to the contention noted in the judgment (3 D.L.R. at 394) that the extradition request
may have been illegal, because after surrender the accused might be tried in the United
States on both indictments at the same time. See Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. rule 13, 18 U.S.C.A.
(1948), which provides that the ".... court may order two or more indictments ... to be

tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been
joined in a single indictment ......

94. If any special conditions are to be provided in this regard, they should be In-

corporated in the treaty. Cf. article II of the Supplementary Convention of 1889, supra
note 25, and § 15, Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9, relating to political offenses.
95. See note 93 supra.
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accused is not self-executing and the final determination as to whether
the surrender shall be made is vested in the discretion of the executive
department."
Under the treaty provisions too, the requesting country is duty
bound to try the accused upon surrender solely for the offenses as to
which extradition is granted. 97 It is not to be assumed by the judge in
advance that the requesting country will breach this treaty obligation.
In any event, failure to comply with a treaty condition would be solely
the concern of the executive, who has ample power to take such remedial
action as to him may seem proper in the circumstances. 8
Finally, insofar as the extradition judge suggested that the indictments
before him charged other offenses, 9 in addition to violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Mail Fraud statute, he
did not fully appreciate the elements of the offenses charged and the
testimony of an "eminent member of the New York Bar"100 who testified
as a legal expert on United States law and who lucidly explained the
nature of the offenses covered by the indictments. 1 '
Under the statutes involved, before an offense is shown, one of
the essential elements which must be established is the scheme to
defraud; 0 2 and the crime is completed when the mails 0 3 are used "to
96. See § 25, Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9. For the similar United States
provision, see 62 Stat. 824, 18 US.C.A. § 3186 (1948).
97. Article III of the Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1889, supra note 25.
Even without such a treaty provision, the rule would be so in the United States. See

United States v. Rauscher, 119 US. 407, 430 (1886), holding that absent an affirmative
provision to the contrary, a person could be tried only for the crime for which be was
extradited. See also Cosgrove v. Winey, 174 US. 64 (1899) and Collins v. Johnston, 237
US. 502 (1915).

98. The Treaty and the Supplementary Conventions each affirmtively provide that the
extradition arrangements "shall continue in force until one or the other of the parties shall
signify its wish to terminate it, and no longer." Article XI, Webster-Ashburton Treaty,
supra note 21. See also article IX, Supplementary Convention of 1889; article II, Supplementary Conventions of 1900, 1905 and 1952; article III, Supplementary Conventions
of 1922 and 1925.

99. US.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.LRL at 393).
100. The description is that used by the judge in referring to William R. Meagher,
Esq, of New York City, who was the legal expert called on behalf of the United States
Government in the case.
101. In the Matter of USA. and Walter H. Link and Harry H. Green, supra note 7,
voL 10, Record of Evidence and Proceedings (Nov. 9, 1954) pp. 59-64, 70, 79-SO, 122, 12431, vol. 22, supra note 88 (Nov. 30, 1954) pp. 45-52, 80.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 232 US. 155, 161-62 (1914); Durland v. United
States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-15 (1896); Mansfield v. United States, 155 F.2d 952, 953-s5
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, Browne v. United States, 329 US. 792 (1946); United States
v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 US. 859 (1944); Chew v. United States, 9 F.2d 348, 350-52 (8th Cir.
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employ" or for the "purpose of executing" such a scheme. While there
are no cases construing the Canadian Mail Fraud Statute, 104 the same
requirements undoubtedly are applicable under this provision, which
also speaks in terms of prohibiting "use of the mails . . . concerning
schemes devised or intended to deceive and defraud the public ....
00
Thus, the portions of the indictments which were construed as
"charging the commission of many [other] criminal offenses," in fact,
did no more than furnish the requisite description of the scheme to defraud, which the accused were charged with having devised and employed. It is incongruous to hold, because the particular scheme involved activities which also might be broken down and separately
charged as additional offenses under Canadian law, that this somehow
was a valid reason for refusing extradition. This can lead only to absurd
results. For all that the schemers need do to defeat extradition is to
make sure that the scheme they contrive and employ includes as an integral part thereof activities which are also criminal under other statutes. 0 6
It was also held that the fraudulent conduct charged under the Securities Act indictment did not fall within enumeration 11A of the 1952
Supplementary Extradition Convention.10 7 This ruling is inconsistent
with the background and purpose of the convention and involves a restricted and unrealistic application of the double criminality doctrine.
The background summary of the negotiations leading up to the 1952
treaty amendment 0 " amply demonstrates that the very target at which
the new convention provisions were aimed was the "boiler-room" fraud
1925). Under the Securities Act the scheme must, of course, also relate to the sale of
securities.
103. Or, under the Securities Act, the use of the proscribed interstate faculties.
104. Section 209(c) (now § 324) of the Canadian Criminal Code, see supra note 72.
105. The effect of the instant decision would be to block the prosecution at the very
threshold of its proof of the case by barring any evidence of the fraudulent scheme which
occurred "independently of the use of the mails." See U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra
note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 393).
106. This, too, is wholly apart from the fact that, while actually irrelevant In the drcumstances of this case, the judge cited no authority to support his conclusion that because the telephone calls may have emanated from Montreal, the false pretenses and fraud
were committed there. As a matter of fact, it would seem more consonant with law
and logic to say that they were committed where the victims who received the calls were
located. And query, whether it would be different if the telephone calls emanated from
the victims, as is frequently the case, as collect calls made in response to requests by the
promoters to do so. Moreover, as a minimum it would seem to be a most restricted and
narrow construction and a failure to accord proper understanding to this modem medium
of communication, to say that the false pretenses were not made at least at both places.
107. U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 391-92).
108. See p. 311 supra.
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promotions, which were being carried on by long distance telephone and
the mails from Canada into this country in violation of the Securities
Act 1°9 and the Mail Fraud statute.
In the light of the problem the treaty amendment was intended to
reach, it is difficult to explain the reason for the inclusion of the broad
language of item 11A of the Convention, unless it was intended to cover
Securities Act fraud offenses. The I1B proviso alone was sufficient to
cover mail frauds. In the presentation of the Convention before the
Canadian House of Commons Committee, the provisions of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act were specifically equated to and presented as an
analogue to section 444 of the Canadian Criminal Code, the provisions of
which are reflected in enumeration 11A of the treaty amendment. 110
The Double Criminality Doctrine
It was held, however, that since section 17(a) of the Securities
Act required the use of the mails or interstate facilities to constitute
a violation, and section 444 of the Canadian Criminal Code did not,
the sections were not similar." This holding represents a restricted
and artificial application of the double criminality standard, and one
109. We have previously alluded to the statement of purpose contained in the preamble
to the Convention. Despite its broad language, the extradition judge read it as being
merely a restatement of the "well known doctrine" of double criminality. USAL v. Link
and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 393). The quote from the preamble included in
the decision to support this construction, however, omits the specific reference made therein
regarding the intendment of the contracting parties to amend the extradition arrangements
so as to comprehend "particularly those [frauds] which occur in connection with transactions in securities." See note S supra.
110. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 10, supra note 5, at 267-69, 287.
See also Debates of Canadian Senate, 316-19 (1952). Cf. M.inutes of Proceedings, supra
at 282-83; Debates of Canadian House of Commons 2425 (1952), where it was pointed
out that the only type of communication specifically covered by the treaty was the mails.
The use of other types of communication facilities, of course, would not alone afford a
separate basis for extradition, as in the case of the mails, in view of the limited !cope of
item lIB. But obviously, where the fraudulent conduct falls within the provisions of
11A, that item would afford the necessary basis for extradition, for, as was observed by
a member of the House of Commons Committee, 11llA covers everything." See Minutes,
supra at 283.
Ill. To support this conclusion the judgment referred to the "very clear and lucid
proof" of the United States legal expert, Mr. Meagher, in which he explained that there
was no "Federal law similar to Section 444" in wording because the fraud had to be related to the use of the mails or interstate facilities in order to provide federal jurisdiction.
(3 D.L.R. at 391-92). But the decision does not reflect the equally cogent testimony of
the expert to the effect that § 17(a) of the Securities Act was analogous to § 444, except
that the latter was broader, because it was not jurisdictionally limited and was not restricted solely to the sale of securities as was the Securities Act provision. U.A. v. Link
and Green, supra note 7, voL 10, Record of Evidence and Proceedings (Nov. 9, 1954)
pp. 84-87.
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which is inconsistent with the development and purpose of that doctrine.
The double criminality principle has obtained wide acceptance and is
adhered to in both England and Canada112 and also is followed in the
United States."' It should be emphasized that the doctrine requires
only that the conduct involved be criminal by the laws of both countries.
It does not require "that there must be an exact identity of the offense
named in the two systems of law; it means merely that the act charged
11 4
must fall within the proscription of the two systems of criminal law."
The United States and Canadian decisions are to the same effect. As
stated in Collins v. Loisel:115
"The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the
two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the
particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions."11

Similarly, as noted in Re Gaynor & Greene (No. 11):117
"The practice has been; in England, the United States and Canada, not to insist
on an absolute identity between the offence as described in the laws in force in
either territories, provided it appears clear that the facts alleged and proved as the
ground for extradition contain the essential elements of a like extraditable crime in
each country." ' s

Although the Canadian decisions tend to emphasize a comparison of
112. Hudson, The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition, 28 Am. J. Int'l
L. 274, 283-300 (1934). Cf. Borchard, The Factor Extradition Case, 28 Am. J. Int'l L.
742 (1934), where it is contended that the doctrine is not an established principle of International law.
113. But see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). There the Supreme Court
held that since the extradition arrangements with Great Britain expressly required that
only certain of the treaty listed offenses be punishable by the laws of both countries, that
double criminality was not required as to the other treaty offenses, which did not contain
such a modifying provision. However the court noted that while the particular offense
was not criminal in the state of asylum (Illinois), it was generally recognized as a crime
by the laws of both countries and was clearly within the treaty coverage. Whether the
decision be construed as an abandonment of the double criminality doctrine, unless the
treaty expressly requires it, or as merely a liberal application of the doctrine, the result
reached by the court, in any event, is consonant with the purpose of the doctrine. See
also Note, 42 Yale LJ. 978 (1933).
114. Hudson, op. cit. supra note 112, at 285. See also Borchard, op. cit. supra note
112, at 745-46.
115. 259 US. 309 (1922). See also e.g., Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 14 (1916); Wright
v. Henkel, 190 US. 40, 58 (1903). And see Factor v. Laubenheimer, supra note 113.
116. Collins v. Loisel, supra note 115, at 312.
117. 10 C.C.C. 154 (Que. K.B. 1905). See also e.g., Rex. v. Stone, 17 C.C.C. 249, affId,
17 C.C.C. 377, 391 (Que. K.B. 1911), and Re Sieman, [1930 1 W.W.R. 970, 974 (B.C.)
(prisoner committed on reapplication, see (1930] 2 W.W.R. 111, 411, 412).
Lamar, supra note 37.
118. Re Gaynor and Greene (No. 11), supra note 117, at 163.

Cf. In re
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the statutes in the respective countries, while the United States cases, on
the other hand, tend to emphasize the particular conduct proscribed as
criminal in both countries, it is clear that neither country has ever insisted that the offenses shall be identical, either in name or in all technical respects, but rather only that substantially the same conduct shall
be criminal in both. 1 9 This approach is entirely consistent with the
origin and development of the principle, which, as Professor Hudson has
pointed out, was designed to insure that persons would not be extradited
for conduct not deemed contrary to the mores or criminal laws of the
country of asylum. 2 To apply it otherwise and thus emphasize technical
differences between the offenses in the domestic and foreign countriesparticularly where they are required solely because of differences in the
governmental systems, represents a perversion of the rule. It is plain
that section 444 of the Canadian Code makes criminal the conduct for
which extradition was sought in the instant case.1' As already noted,
in its fraud coverage section 444 is broader than section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933; similarly, in its general coverage it is also broader
in that it does not require-as does section 17(a)-the proof of the use
of particular jurisdictional facilities.'
Both acts are designed to reach
fraudulent schemes, and it is only because of the United States federal
system that the use of the mails or interstate facilities, are required as an
element of the offense.m Under the circumstances, to hold that they do
not mutually satisfy the double criminality requirement is inconsistent
with the object and purpose of the principle.
Constructive Presence in the Foreign Country
In the course of the hearing concern was expressed over the fact that
the accused had never been physically present in the United States where
the fraud was effected." 4 There were alsoset forth in some detail the
contentions which were raised with respect to the question of the juris119. See cases cited notes 115, 117 supra.
120. See Hudson, op. cit. supra note 112, at 282-83.
121. Upon the denial of the extradition request, the accused were immediately charged
at Montreal with violating § 444 of the Canadian Criminal Code, as well as § 209(c) and
§ 573, now § 403(1) (d) the Canadian Conspiracy Statute, 1892 Code § 527 (amended
1906 Code § 573).
122. See note Ill supra.
123. See United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421, 425 (1942), aff'd, 147 F.2d 916
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1944). See also Loss, op. cit. supra note 18, at 876-77.
124. See, e.g., the judge's reference to the US. prosecution as being a "backdoor" one.
U.S.L v. Link and Green, supra note 7, vol 22, Record of Evidence and Proceedings
(Nov. 30, 1954) p. 101. The judge had no difficulty in finding that the accused were
"fugitives" (3 D.L.R. at 387), in view of the dear definition of fugitive contained in
§ 2(d) of the Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9, as including a person in Canada who

is accused of an extradition crime committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state.
See also note 23 supra.
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diction of the United States court over the offenses involved, because of
the fact that the mailings had emanated from Canada, but it was stated
that it was unnecessary "to decide this interesting question." 125
In view of the long established jurisprudence as to the sufficiency of
constructive presence as a basis for jurisdiction, both as a matter of
general law as well as of extradition law,120 it is difficult to understand
a reluctance to concede the existence of United States jurisdiction.121
As early as the 1800's the English courts held that an accused
could be extradited from England to a foreign country-although never
physically present there-where he had by use of the mails obtained
property by false pretenses from a victim located in such foreign
country.12 Thus, it was established at this early date that a "person
may, by his acts, bring himself between the territorial laws of two countries, being actually present in one and constructively present in the
other, in which case therefore both countries have territorial jurisdiction
over him and as in the case of Nillins the country in which he is only constructively present may demand his extradition from the other." "
The contention that the United States did not have jurisdiction over
a mail fraud offense committed by the posting of a letter by an accused
in Canada which was received by an addressee in the United States was
squarely rejected in United States v. Steinberg,180 where the court noted:
"... It has long been a commonplace of criminal liability that a person may be
charged in the place where the evil results, though he is beyond the jurisdiction
when he starts the train of events of which that evil is the fruit. Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284, 285, 31 S. Ct. 558, 55 L. Ed. 735; Lamar v. United States,
240 U.S. 60, 64, 65, 66, 36 S. Ct. 255, 60 L. Ed. 526; Ford v. United States, 273
125. U.S.A. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 394-95).
126. See cases cited note 128 infra.
127. This is particularly so in view of the specific application of item lB to use of
the mails. Manifestly the judge failed to distinguish between the use of the mail facilities
of a country and the nature of the mailings which may be carried by such facilities. Thus,
where letters are delivered in this country, it is plain that the mails of the United States
are used, regardless of whether the letter itself is a Canadian, French or United States one.
128. See Regina v. Nillins, [1884) 53 LJ. (M.C.) 157. See also Regina v. Jacobi and
Hiller [18811, 46 L.T. 595 (n. a); Rex v. Godfrey [19231 1 K.B. 24. And see Ex parte
Hammond, note 130 infra. The background materials show that the treaty negotiators were
aware of this jurisprudence. See Minutes, etc., supra note 110 and Debates of Canadian
Senate, supra note 110.
129. Piggott, Extradition 71 (1910).
130.

62 F. 2d 77 at 78 (2d Cir. 1932). See also Kaufman v. United States, 163 F. 2d 404,

411 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); Ex parte Hammond, 59 F. 2d 683,
686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Hammond v. Sittell, 287 U.S. 640 (1932) ; and 1 Oppenhelm on
International Law 639, and note 1 (Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1948). In the Hammond case,
supra, extradition was granted from the United States to Canada of an accused, who had not
been present in Canada, for the extradition offense of obtaining money and property by
false pretenses in Canada by means of a false bank draft.
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U.S. 593, 620, 621, 47 S. Ct. 531, 71 L. Ed. 793. The constitutional question is
frivolous."131

In the Ford case, 32 the United States Supreme Court in overruling a
similar jurisdictional contention, pointed out:
"In Regina v. Garrett, Dearsly's Crown Cases Reserved, 232, 241, Lord Campbell said:
"'I do not proceed upon the ground that the offense was committed beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court'-which was the fact there--'for if a man employ a conscious or unconscious agent in this country, he may be amenable to the laws of
England, although at the time he was living beyond the jurisdiction'
"It will be found among the earlier cases that the principle is sometimes qualified
by saying that the person out of the State cannot be held for a crime committed
within the State by his procuration unless it is done by an innocent agent or a
mechanical one; but the weight of authority is now against such limitation....
"'The principle that a man who outside of a country wilfully puts in motion a
force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries. And the methods which modem
invention has furnished for the performance of criminal acts in that manner has
made this principle one of constantly growing importance and of increasing frequency of application.
"'Its logical soundness and necessity received early recognition in the common
law. Thus it was held that a man who erected a nuisance in one county which took
effect in another was criminally liable in the county in which the injury was done.
(Bulwer's case, 7 Co. 2 b. 3 b.; Com. Dig. Action, N. 3, 11.) So, if a man, being
in one place, circulates a libel in another, he is answerable at the latter place. (Seven
Bishops' case, 12 State Trials, p. 331; Rex v. Johnson, 7 East. 65.)' "13

In an earlier case, In re Palliser,13 the Supreme Court, in holding that
an offense involving use of the mails was punishable at the place where
a letter was received as well as at the place of mailing, stated:
".. . it is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that he may be tried
and punished at that place, whether the unlawfulness of the communication through
the post-office consists in its being a threatening letter; The King v. Girdwood, 1
Leach, 142; S.C. 2 East P.C. 1120; Essers Case, 2 East P.C. 1125; or a libel; The
King v. Johnson, 7 East, 65; S.C. 3 J. P. Smith, 94; The King v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald.
95, 136, 150, 170, 184; Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304; In re Buell, 3 Dillon, 116, 122; or a false pretence or fraudulent representation; Regina v. Leech,
Dearsly, 642, S.C. 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 100; The Queen v. Rogers, 3 Q.B.D. 28; S.C.
14 Cox. Crim. Cas. 22; People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509; People v. Adams, 3 Denio,
190, and 1 N.Y. 173; Foute v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 712"' 35

In the light of the above English and United States authorities and in

view of the modem means of communication it is somewhat surprising
131. United States v. Steinberg, supra note 130, at 78.
132.

273 U.S. 593, 621, 623 (1926).

133. Id.at 621, 623.
134. 136 U.S. 257 (1890).
135. Id. at 266-67.
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that the question as to whether constructive presence is sufficient to afford a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction should be presented as an "interesting" one.
Interpretation of the Treaty
It has also been suggested that perhaps a treaty should be interpreted
by the narrow rules of construction applicable to statutes and particularly those applicable to criminal statutes. 130 In the light of the fact that
the treaty represents an agreement between two sovereign governments,
it would appear that it should not be restrictively construed but rather
liberally interpreted to effectuate the intent of the high contracting
parties.3 Thus, where a treaty may be ambiguous in its provisions, 38
reference should be made to such background materials as may reflect the
intention of the parties concerned. In the instant case the principle followed was that applied by the English and Canadian courts of not referring to legislative materials in the interpretation of statutes, so that there
was a declination to accept any proof with regard to the intention of the
parties in adopting the Supplementary Extradition Convention of 1952.
This English-Canadian principle of non-reference to legislative materials
in the case of statutory construction, has no place in the interpretation
of treaty agreements. In any event, even under the Canadian rule applicable to statutory construction, it has been emphasized that in cases
of genuine ambiguity consideration should be given to "the general object and broad purpose of the legislation, which in most instances can
be elicited partly from the context and partly from the knowledge of
those who will give close attention to public affairs .... For it can be
said with some confidence that the majority which supported the bill in'
tended that it should be reasonably effective in achieving its purpose."
The strained and narrow result reached in the instant judgment wholly
fails to accord with the above principle. 4"
136.

U.SA. v. Link and Green, supra note 7 (3 D.L.R. at 395).

137. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933): "In choosing
between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling In International agreements." See also In re Arton (No. 2, [18961 1 Q.B. 509, 517; Lauterpacht,
Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties,
26 Brit. Year Book Int'l L. 48 (1949); Some Observations on Preparatory Work In the Interpretation of Treaties, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1935).
138. The treaty here under consideration, as we have noted, is strikingly free of ambiguity.
139. Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 Can. B.
Rev. 624, at 627 (1954). See also the observations of the author at 637: "If the federal
cabinet finds that there are too many cases where the judges do not grasp the general object and purpose of legislation, let it revive the ancient practice of a short preamble which
is certified by inclusion in the statute itself." In this connection, see note 109 supra.
140. We do not comment on the extradition judge's further suggestion (3 D.L.R. at
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CONCLUSION

In both Canada and the United States no appeal is available to a requesting country from an unsuccessful extradition request. This is true
whether the extradition is refused because of a purported lack of evidence, or for any reason, legal or otherwise. Thus, a well-founded extradition request may be blocked because of either factual or legal errors by
an extradition judge. While reapplication may be made by the requesting
country' in an effort to overcome the adverse decision, this is a wasteful
and outmoded procedure."
In the United States under present procedures it may be by pure
happenstance that the requesting country may obtain a right of appeal
from an adverse ruling. Thus, for example, recently an accused, in lieu
of attacking jurisdiction before the extradition commissioner, immediately sought out a writ of habeas corpus from another judge. 43 Although
the accused was successful in the initial habeas corpus action, he thus
provided an avenue of appeal for the foreign government and on appeal
the judgment was reversed. 144 Had the accused made the same jurisdictional argument in the extradition hearing itself, and obtained a ruling
in his favor, there would have been no appeal available to the foreign
country.
In Canada the accused also may seek a writ of habeas corpus 4 ' from
an extradition committal, but no appeal is provided to either party from
the decision on the habeas corpus petition. 40
It would seem consonant with the development of modem procedural
practices that the extradition procedures should be reformed, so that at
least with respect to legal errors, an appeal avenue may be available to
a requesting country from denial of an extradition request. The comity
which should exist between friendly countries having international extradition agreements would seem to require more than the preliminary
hearing now provided by an extradition commissioner or judge.
395-96) that perhaps the whole treaty was a nullity because it was entered into in the
name of the Dominion of Canada rather than in the name of her Majesty. See § 2(b) of
the Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9.
141. See Re Harsha, [1906] 11 O.L.R. 457, 42 C.LJ. 356, 11 C.C.C. 62, 20 Can. Abr.

128 (CA), aff'd in this respect, 42 C.LJ. 754 (P.C.); Re Parker [1890] 26 CL.J. 619,
10 CL.T. 373, 20 Can. Abr. 128 (Ont.); Ex parte Seitz [1899] 8 Que. Q.B. 392, 3 C.C.C.
127, 20 Can. Abr. 128. And see e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 262 US. 426, 429-30 (1923).
142. See, e.g, the three Collins cases. Collins v. Loisel, supra note 141; 259 US. 309

(1922) and Collins v. Miller 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
143.

144.
145.
146.
See Re

Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952).

Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954).
Section 19(a) of the Canadian Extradition Act, supra note 9.
Section 40 of the Canadian Supreme Court Act (1952) R.S.C. c. 259, at 5007, and
Storgoff, [1945] S.C.R. 526, 84 C.C.C. 1, 1945 Can. Abr. 414.

